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VOLUME 32 SPRING, 1965 NUMBER 3
THE WAYS AND MEANINGS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
AND STRICT LIABILITY*
ROGER J. TRAYNOR*
We have come a long way from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Com-
pany.' The great expansion of a manufacturer's liability for negligence
since that case marks the transition from industrial revolution to a
settled industrial society. The courts of the nineteenth century made
allowance for the growing pains of industry by restricting its duty of
care to the consumer. They restricted the duty so much that in 1842
a court could say about the injured plaintiff in Winterbottom v. Wright
that "it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a
remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced." 2
With a tour de force of supreme simplicity the court demonstrated that
it was not under the influence. It ignored strict liability, made short
shrift of the issue of the manufacturer's negligence, carried the injured
plaintiff to the doorstep of privity of contract, and left him on the
doorstep. However clearly the manufacturer could foresee injuries
to others, the court confined his duty of reasonable care to those in
privity, and confined privity to those with whom he dealt directly.
It feared that otherwise there would be "the most absurd and out-
rageous consequences."3  In effect it feared a plaintiff-population
explosion, and could not envisage how a manufacturer could be
expected to exercise reasonable care toward just anybody he could
foresee might suffer injury from his defective product.
This article was delivered as a lecture at the Seventy-fifth Anniversary Program of
the University of Tennessee College of Law on April 23, 1965.
**Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
1. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
The College of Law of the University of Tennessee has made outstanding
contributions to the literature on products liability. A notable collection of
essays explores the subject in 24 TENN. L. REv. 923-1018 (1957). Moreover,
Professor Dix Noel has greatly clarified the subject in a series of perceptive
articles. See Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,
Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L. J. 43 (1955); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L. J. 816 (1962); Noel,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Noel, Duty to Warn
Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REv. 331 (1959); Noel, Manufacturers of
Products - The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24, TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957);
Noel, Products Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee 22 TENN. L. REv. 985
(1953); Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32
TENN. L. REV. 207 (1965).
2. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842).
3. 10 M & W at 114, 152 Eng.Rep. at 405 (1842).
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The Winterbottom rationale assumed that industry could not grow
and prosper if it had to pay for any and all injuries its defective
products caused. The assumption rested on the oft-disproved notion
that wheels operate at peak efficiency when unattended by brakes.
It took time, a long stretch of it from 1842's Winterbottom v. Wright
to 1916's MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, for the courts to
articulate their disquiet over the ever-widening zones in which the
defective products of enterprise were set loose. Disquiet there was
as injuries mounted and often went uncompensated in the wake of
mass production and distribution. In many an opinion the question
festered without satisfactory answer: Can enterprise hew to the line
of the profit margin only by letting its victims fall where they may,
redressing no more than the privity-privileged?
When Judge Cardozo rejected so narrow a view, he raised the
standard of care to normal by reasoning from what had long been obvious
but unheeded. The manufacturer of automobiles often deals only with
dealers, and the dealer resells the product to the consumer. "The
dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some
approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet the
defendant would have us say that he was the one person whom it was
under a legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconse-
quent a conclusion."4
With the manufacturer's liability thus expanded, courts soon pro-
gressed to a realization that it was not enough to raise, to normal the
manufacturer's standard of care in the making of the product. The
safety of the product was also of primary concern. This insight led to
the invocation of res ipsa loquitur to permit an inference of negligence
from the presence of a defect in cases where there was hardly a basis
in common experience for concluding that a defect was probably caused
by negligence.5 With more directness, though at first solely in food
cases,6 the courts began to impose liability on the manufacturer without
negligence when his defective product injured the consumer.
The law developed erratically, however, since compensation for
injury usually depended on how determined or adept the court was to
justify it in terms of conventional legal concepts from (A)gency to at
4. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391 (1916).
5. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 532 (1949) (concurring opinion);
Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALo L. REV. 1, 13 (1951); but see
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products
- An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 944 (1957).
6. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622 (1913); Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co.,
93 Kan. 334 (1914); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864
(1914); see Paossrx, LAW oF Toars 674 (3d ed. 1964).
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least (W)arranty.7 There was repeated invocation of the law of sales
warranty, though with curious twists and turns. The courts reached
to construct a promise by the manufacturer. He would then be liable
for physical injury caused by products that fell short of the judicially
created promise. Nothing in the law of sales warranty, however,
afforded a rational basis for covering some injuries but not others with
judicially created promises. However well warranty served in the field
of commercial transactions, its invocation in torts to rationalize com-
pensation for injury also served to frustrate it. The right to disclaim,
the requirement of timely notice, and chronic preoccupation with
privity of contract barred recovery in ways that were "pernicious and
entirely unnecessary."8 They still bar recovery in many courts, occasion-
ally even in food cases.9 Nevertheless, an increasing number of courts10
that invoke warranty to afford recovery for physical injuries have
rejected the requirements of notice" or privity12 and the right to
disclaim.18  Others have rejected the fiction of warranty in toto,
holding the manufacturer to strict liability in tort.14
Regardless of whether a court resorts to tortured concepts of
warranty or invokes strict liability in tort, the manufacturer is liable
only for some of the physical injuries caused by his products, Until
recently courts and commentators have concentrated on eliminating bars
to recovery imposed by the law of sales.15 Now they confront the
central question: When should the manufacturer be responsible to
those injured by his products? One cannot look to warranty for a
comprehensive answer, for it was designed to ensure commercial satis-
7. See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-155 (1958).
8. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
9. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 676 (3d ed. 1964); c. Plant, supra note 5, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938, 946-950 (1957); Smyser, Products Liability and The American
Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L. J. 343 (1965).
10. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 677-8 (3d ed. 1964); Noel, supra note 1, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 963 (1957).
11. Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648 (1923); LaHue v. Coca-Cola
Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645 (1957); Capman v. Brown, 198 F.SupJp. 78, 85,
(D.C.D.Haw. 1961) aff'd Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962);
Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1130-1131 (1960). See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 61-62 (1963); ct. Note, Notice Require-
ment in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 586 (1963).
12. E.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120
(1958); Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instraument Corp., 12 N.Y.S.2d 432, 437 (1963).
13. Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358 (1960).
14. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 (1963); Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 261 (1963); Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc.
207 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1965); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRrs §402 A (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
15. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
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faction rather than compensation for physical injury.10 The common
warranty standard is that the goods be fit for the ordinary purposes
for which they are used.' 7 The Supreme Court of California has
adopted the enlarged standard that "a manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being." 8 Similarly, the Second Restatement
of Torts provides that "one who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused. *.."x The
predication of the manufacturer's liability on a defect in the product
precludes compensation for injuries from the use of non-defective
products. Thus the manufacturer's strict liability depends on what is
meant by defective.
The reasons justifying strict liability emphasize that there is some-
thing wrong, if not in the manufacturer's manner of production, at
least in his product. Thus, it is said that strict liability "will provide
a healthy and highly desirable incentive for producers to make their
products safe," 2 0 and that "the public interest in human life, health
and safety demands the maximum possible protection that the law
can give against dangerous defects in products.. ."21 Some two
decades ago it seemed to me more forthright, ina concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, to fix liability upon the one
best able to anticipate and bear the risks of injury from defective
products. "Those who suffer injury from defective products are un-
prepared to meet its consequences. The cost of injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of the injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. . . . However intermittently such injuries may occur and
however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is
a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be
general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best suited
to afford such protection."2 2
It should be clear that the manufacturer is not an insurer for all
16. See UsiFRacoMMERAuCODE §2-314 (2) (a), (b), (d), (e), (f).
17. t'NIFoRM COM MERCIAL CODE §2-314 (2) (C).
18. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 (1963).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
20. Cf. Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
21. Cf. id. at 1122 (1960).
22. 24 Cal.2d 453, 462 (1944) (concurring opinion); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
§402A, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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injuries caused by his products. A bottling company is liable for the
injury caused by a decomposing mouse found in its bottle. It is not
liable for whatever harm results to the consumer's teeth from the sugar
in its beverage. A knife manufacturer is not liable when the user cuts
himself with one of its knives. When the injury is in no way attributable
to a defect there is no basis for strict liability.
How then do we determine what injuries are attributable to the
manufacturer? How do we recognize the fatal flaw that imposes
liability?
A defect may be variously defined; as yet no definition has been
formulated that would resolve all cases. A defective product may be
defined as one that fails to match the average quality of like products,
and the manufacturer is then liable for injuries resulting from deviations
from the norm. Thus, the lathe in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.23 was defective because it was not built with a proper fastening
device as other lathes are. The automobile in Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co.24 was defective because the brakes went on unexpectedly, as
normal brakes do not. Although many questions still attend the problem
of harm caused by smoking itself, courts have found the manufacturer
liable for injury from a foreign object in the tobacco. 25  If a normal
sample of defendant's product would not have injured plaintiff, but
the peculiarities of the particular product did cause harm, the manu-
facturer is liable for injuries caused by this deviation.
Definitioz. of a defect in terms of deviation from the norm, however,
breaks down in some cases, as when it is over-inclusive. On guard
against such a possibility, the Restatement of Torts would impose no
strict liability for what are classified as "unavoidably unsafe products."2 6
A classic example is blood. Courts have yet to hold a hospital or blood
bank liable when a patient contracts hepatitis in consequence of receiving
a transfusion of infected blood.27  The common rationalization is that
the transfusion of blood is a service, not a sale, and that there is hence
23. 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963).
24. 61 Cal.2d 256 (1963).
25. Meditz v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 167 Misc. 176 (1938); Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. (65 (1932); Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
117 Miss. 490 (1918); see Comment. 42 B. U. L. REv. 250, 251 (1962).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), T1ORTs §402A, Comment k (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
27. See Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241 (1961);
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100 (1954); Parker v. State, 280
App. Div. 157 (1952); Merck & Co. v. Kidd. 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1952);
Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn.,
1965); Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 523 (1963).
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no implied warranty of merchantability. 28 Another view is that since
it is as yet impossible to detect or prevent serum hepatitis, the risk
thereof is inherent in blood transfusions. Thus the New York Court of
Appeals has declared that "The art of healing frequently calls for a
balancing of risks and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if injury
results from the course adopted, when no negligence or fault is present,
liability should not be imposed upon the institution or agency actually
seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient."20 Still other courts
rationalize that hospitals and blood banks should be exempt from
liability by virtue of being charitable, nonprofit organizations. The
Supreme Court of Utah has set forth this view picturesquely in its
statement that "We think that practically all hospitals are bourns of
mercy and most physicians are unselfish disciples of relief and the cure
of human ills. We think of hospitals not as profit-seeking vendors
in the market place as might be attributed to General Foods, General
Motors. . .. No hospital gives green trading stamps as some commodity
vendors do, or a car for one having the lucky blood purchase order
number."30 The court's logic is as facile as its humor. The usual
patient enters a hospital with the hope of getting well, not of getting
hepatitis. He would happily pay, given the choice, for some commercial
stamp or number that would give him no chance of getting no compen-
sation in the event he got hepatitis.
Far from restricting immunity from strict liability such as blood
banks enjoy, the Restatement would extend it even to manufacturers
of many drugs of uniform quality,31 if their usefulness appears to
outweigh the known dangers that attend their use. Thus ill health
offers adventure; no one has a better chance to live dangerously than
the ill who must take their medicine.
There has been criticism of such limitations on liability. If a product
is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to exempt the
manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other sample of his
product would produce like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a
norm of safety as a basis for imposing liability, should we not scrutinize
all the more the product whose norm is danger? Such scrutiny is
especially sensible for drugs for which a reasonably safe substitute exists.
28. See Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241 (1961);
Perimutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100 (1954); CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE
§1623. Cf. Farnsworth, Imphed Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. RiEv. 653, 672 (1957).
29. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 107 (1954).
30. Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 243-244
(1961).
31. RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) rORTS §402A, Comment k (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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Thalidomide sleeping pills afford a recent dramatic example of such
a dangerous product.82 Other drugs, which must be used despite the
danger, perhaps should be treated differently. No test differentiates
the nature of a defect in such disparate circumstances.
The definition of defect in terms of deviation from a norm presents
other difficulties, as in the allergy cases. 33  Why should a manufacturer
be liable for injury caused by one sample in 10,000 containing a foreign
substance and yet not be liable for injury to the one user in 10,000
who is allergic to any sample? The argument is that the injury is as
much attributable to the user's allergy as to the product, and hence he
should bear the costs of injury. Who can know, however, what his
allergies will be until they emerge in contact with a given drug? The
inevitable query is whether a manufacturer should provide for the
occasional risk of allergy as a cost of doing business.34 A manufacturer
of nonessential products, such as cosmetics, might more appropriately
be held responsible for such risk than the manufacturer of essential drugs.
The issue of the manufacturer's liability in the allergy cases cannot
be resolved in terms of the deviation-from-the-norm test of defectiveness,
for it is the allergic user and not the drug that proves to be outside the
norm. Some courts have therefore resorted to what might be called
the numbers test, adjusted for the gravity of the harm. If the allergy
is rare, the defect is deemed to be in the user and not in the product,
and therefore the manufacturer is not held for the harm resulting from
the use of his product.3 5 If the allergy is common, or if it is serious
though uncommon, the courts tend to associate defectiveness with the
product rather than with the user.36 It is difficult and often impossible,
however, to compile reliable statistics on such matters. 37 Moreover,
there is a gray area wherein an adverse reaction has yet to be identified
as an allergy.
Even in standard cases the deviation-from-the-norm test is not so
simple as it sounds. If an automobile part normally lasts five years,
but the one in question proves defective after six months of normal use,
32. See P. Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REV. 854, 867 (1963).
33. Cf. Noel, supra note 1, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 969-971; 12 VAND. L. REV. 331 (1959).
34. See Green, Should the Man ufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence, 24 TENN. L. REv. 928, 934 (1957).
35. E.g., Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141 (1959); Bennett v. Pilot Products Co.,
120 Utah 474 (1951); Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
36. E.g., Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21 (1939); Bianchi v. Denholm &
McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469 (1939); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45
(1913); see generally, PROSSER, TORTS 669 (3d ed. 1964).
37. See Elkind, Counsel for the Plaintiff Views the Problem of the Allergic Consumer,
20 Bus. LAw. 179 (1964); cf. Freedman, Products Compensation; Who's Pushing
Whom?, 20 Bus. LAW. 167 (1964).
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there would be enough deviation to serve as a basis for holding the
manufacturer liable for any resulting harm. What if the part lasts
four of the normal five years, however, and then proves defective? For
how long should a manufacturer be responsible for his product? More-
over, with what class of goods should the product be compared? The
deviation from the norm would vary according to whether, for example,
a part in a used 1949 car is compared with like parts in other used
cars, or in other used cars of the same make, or in other used 1949 cars,
or in other cars with comparable ownership and driving histories.
The Restatement of Torts suggests another definition of defectiveness.
"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." 38 Such a definition is designed to exclude liability in
certain cases; thus "good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful. .. ."3 The definition
emphasizes the unexpected dangers of the product.
The Restatement test can encompass deviation-from-the-norm defects,
though its primary concern is with the surprise element of danger.
Thus abundant public discussion of the cancer-producing possibilities of
cigarette smoking has insured common knowledge of potential dangers.
It can hardly be said now that the risk comes as a surprise merely
because millions of users regard them as fit for ordinary use.
Some dangers are generic to the goods, so that people regard the
goods as fit for ordinary use even with such qualities. The manufacturer
would not be liable, under the Restatement test, for harm caused by
generic dangers. Under such a test, liability would turn on what we
mean by generic.
The now patent risks of cigarettes are not comparable to those of,
say, matches or knives. Commentators describe the ignitable tip or
the cutting edge as qualities generic to the goods; both the manufacturer
and the consumer expect and want the product to burn or cut. The
cancer-producing qualities of cigarettes are generic only in the sense
that all cigarettes have those qualities but they are neither produced
nor consumed for that reason. They may be likened to the matches of
the nineteenth century, whose phosphorous fumes entered the body
through cavities in teeth and caused necrosis of the liver, or poisoned
the air that people inhaled. With the development of the safety match,
these dangers were eliminated.40  The harm-producing qualities of
38. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
39. Ibid.
40. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 45-47, Match.
370 [Vol. 32
THE WAYS AND MEANINGS 371
cigarettes may be no more generic than the harm-producing qualities
of pre-safety matches.
Emphasis on generic qualities, or what the Restatement views as
commonly contemplated characteristics, should not afford a basis for
charging the consumer with assumption of the risk of the harm some
products cause. Were a consumer deemed to assume all commonly
known risks, we would come full circle round to the problems generated
by the disclaimer of warranty in the implied warranty cases.41  A
consumer compelled to assume the risks of the products he uses would
be denied recovery in the face of the public policy that holds the
manufacturer liable for some of the injuries caused by his products.
The role of assumption of risk in products liability cases is properly a
limited one. It applies only to actions of the consumer that shift the
blame from the manufacturer to him. Thus, courts require the
plaintiff to show that he made "normal use" of the product. 4 2 Moreover,
if the plaintiff understands the risk in a product, consents to take that
risk, and continues to use the product, the harm thereafter incurred
would seem to be self-inflicted, and the plaintiff would then be barred
from recovery.43
The cigarette cases illustrate the difficulties presented by the defi-
nition of defect in terms of deviation from common expectation. One of
the purposes of the test is to exclude liability for the harmful effects
of smoking. Yet, until recently, the harm caused by smoking was
unknown to the consumer, so that the cigarette manufacturer would
be liable under this test to those injured before the danger became
widely known. Even now, assumption of the risk presents special
difficulties in connection with cigarette smoking. Given the habit-
forming nature of cigarettes, it is questionable how voluntarily many
consumers are continuing to smoke. Moreover, there are no warnings
on cigarette packages of a sort to bring home the gravity of the risk.
Important though it may be to scrutinize one man's meat for signs of
nonconforming poison, it may more often prove necessary to scrutinize
his conforming poison for signs of warning as to its use and even
reminders as to its patent risks.
41. See generally, R. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22
LA. L. REv. 122 (1961).
42. Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE 14. J. 1099. 1144 (1960); see James, General Products
- Should Manufacturers lie Liable Without Negligence, 24 TEN N. L. REV. 923,
927 (1957).
43. R. Keeton, supra note 41, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 164 (1961). Some would find no
role for assumption of the risk in products liability cases. See Lascher, Strict
Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark,
38 So. CAL. L. REV. 30, 54 (1965). The author was one of plaintiff's counsel in the
Vandermark case, 61 Cal.2d 256, 258 (1963). Cf. Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE L. J.
1099, 1147-1148 (1960).
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TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW
What is the effect of warning or notice? The Restatement provides:
"Where proper warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that
it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning which
is safe for use if the warning is heeded, is not in a defective condi-
tion. ... "4 Example: poison. A warning or notice cannot be used,
however, to mask a disclaimer of responsibility that would shift the
risk to the consumer. Thus, a notice by a manufacturer of soft drinks
listing the possible foreign substances that might be contained in a
bottle of its beverage, or a notice by an automobile manufacturer listing
possible difficulties that might be encountered by the user of the car,
would not preclude liability.45 On the other hand, it may sometimes
be unnecessary for a manufacturer to give a warning or notice, either
because the danger is obvious or because it is unknown.'6 Again,
cigarettes illustrate the possibilities. A manufacturer's failure to give
warning or notice might render the product defective.' 7 A warning
or notice might cure a defect attributable to the product. A warning or
notice might be unnecessary, either because the danger is widely known
or, as in earlier cases, the danger is not known at all.
The complications surrounding the definition of a defect suggest
inquiry as to whether defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of
liability. Some cases avoid such inquiry by defining defect so loosely
as to hold the manufacturer liable for all harm resulting from the use
of his product. Thus, in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company,
the court would find a breach of warranty of merchantability if the
cigarettes were not "reasonably fit and generally intended for smoking
without causing physical injury."' 8 Defect becomes a fiction, however,
if it means nothing more than a condition causing physical injury.
Judge Goodrich would not impose liability unless harm resulted from
the adulteration of a product or a failure to keep a promise of safety.
In his homely words: "If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of
it and gets some liver trouble as a result I do not think the manufacturer
is liable. . . . The same surely is true of one who churns and sells
butter to a customer who should be on a nonfat diet. The same is true,
likewise, as to one who roasts and sells salted peanuts to a customer
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §402A, Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
45. See Noel, supra note 1, 71 YALE L. J. 816, 844 (1962).
46. Compare Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962): Latigue v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 35 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., Inc., 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964), with Green v. American
Tobacco Co. 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182
Cal.App.2d 602 (1960); Kenower v. Hotels Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir.
1942); see Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 526 (1962).
47. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3rd Cir. 1961).
48. Id. at 296 (1961).
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who should be on a no-salt diet. Surely if the butter and the peanuts
are pure there is no liability if the cholesterol count rises dangerously."4 9
No single definition of defect has proved adequate to define the
scope of the manufacturer's strict liability in tort for physical injuries,
but there is now a cluster of useful precedents to supersede the confusing
decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales and warranty law.
The law of contracts and sales can nevertheless still play a vital role
in the delineation of a manufacturer's liability for purely economic
loss as distinguished from physical injuries. In Kyker v. General Motors
Corporation,5o the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the purchaser
of an automobile, in an action against the manufacturer, could not
recover the money paid for the automobile since there was no privity of
contract.51 Warranty law, carefully spelled out in the Uniform Sales
Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, is designed to govern such
commercial questions between the parties. In the commercial setting
the rules of warranty and of notice and disclaimer function well. A
warranty affords a ready basis for determining whether a product is
defective in relation to what the consumer has been led to expect.
Only if the manufacturer agreed to supply a product meeting the
consumer's needs could the consumer hold him liable for the economic
loss when the product failed to meet those needs. Thus courts have
been reluctant to impose liability on a tort theory solely for economic
loss even in actions for negligence. 52
As matters now stand the manufacturer's strict liability in tort is
limited to physical injury caused by a defective product. The early
cases limited strict liability to recovery for physical injuries to the
person,58 but physical injury to property bears such close analogy to
personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them. Thus,
the Second Restatement of Torts would impose strict liability for physical
damage to property as well as to persons.5 '
49. Id. at 302 (1961) (concurring opinion)
50. 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964).
51. The proposition that recovery for economic loss should be governed by the Sales
Act is accepted even by states that have abolished those requirements in personal
injury cases. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1 (Cal. 1965). In Kyker, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee relied on Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal.2d 57 (1963), for the proposition that the Sales Act requires privity
between the parties. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1964).
Although recognizing that the Sales Act zequirements are still appropriate in
some circumstances, California held in Greenman that lack of privity will not
bar recovery in personal injury cases. Tennessee has not abolished the require-
ment of privity m such cases. Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545
(1915); Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1965), cf. Gotts-
danker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App.2d 602 (1960).
52. Prosser, supra note 8, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1103 (196().
53. Id. at 1143 (1960).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTs §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); See Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63A.C. 1, 11 (Cal. 1965).
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A recent California decision gives us a capsule view of how compli-
cations can set in to aggravate the issue of strict liability.5 5  The
plaintiff sued a manufacturer of aspirin. He had used six or eight of
its tablets every other day for 22 years, and there was no issue as to
their uniform quality. His complaint was that acidic substances in
the aspirin caused physical injuries that necessitated removal of his
stomach and other internal organs. In an age of sleep pills and pep
pills and pain-relief pills, and placebos, did plaintiff consume pills to
excess? Since he consumed them only every other day, his daily average
was only three or four. Did 22 years constitute an excessively long
span of consumption? Was he an ordinary consumer or an addict?
Did he understand the risks of his steady dosage? If the acidic qualities
of aspirin were characterized as generic, would they correspond to the
generic cutting edge of a knife, or the cancer-producing elements of
cigarettes?
Was there as little common understanding of such risks as there was
little common understanding until recently of the risks of cigarette
consumption? If so, the manufacturer would have had no reason to
give warning. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer was well situated
to know of such risks, would a warning be enough to prevent liability?
Would failure to warn afford a basis for liability? Would a warning
be superfluous if there were common understanding of the risks? Would
it be as unreasonable to require a manufacturer to caution against a
given intake of aspirin as it would be to require a distiller to caution
against a given intake of alcohol?
What if the plaintiff's reaction to aspirin were allergic and ironically
the source of his continuing dependence on aspirin? Would the allergy
be a relatively common one or the one-in-a-million case? What if the
aspirin alone were to blame but rarely caused such havoc? Should the
manufacturer still be liable on the ground that he is well situated to
bear the cost or to pass it on? Or is there an interest in holding down
such costs on such a staple drug?
One could not conclude the discussion of a case with so many
fascinating problems without asking what became of them. Who
knows? There is no mention of them in the opinion, for the case was
decided on unrelated grounds.
55. Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., 231 A.C.A. 77, 41 Cal.Rptr., 492 (1965). Com-
plications can set in also on the perennially hazardous highway. Recently the
purchaser of an automobile sought damages of 1.1 million dollars from the
manufacturer, alleging that the windshield wipers failed to work during a heavy
rainstorm, that he therefore had to drive with his head out the window, and
that in consequence he contracted bronchial pneumonia. WALL STREET JOURNAL,
p. 1, April 30, 1965.
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So the courts must still struggle not only to delineate the scope of
the manufacturer's liability but also to enforce it. A chronic problem
of enforcement is to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.56  Due
process precludes jurisdiction over nonresidents unless there are "suffi-
cient contact or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable
and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice."07 Consumers often seek to hold suppliers with
whom they have not dealt directly, and the latter may have only tenuous
contacts with the forum state. The defendant in a recent case,58 an
Ohio manufacturer of safety valves, sold one of its products to a Pennsyl-
vania manufacturer of water heaters. The Pennsylvania corporation
sold a water heater to the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois. The plaintiff
was injured when the safety valve failed to work, and she sued the
defendant in Illinois. The only contact that the defendant had with
Illinois was that the plaintiff was injured by the malfunctioning of its
safety valve there. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that there was
jurisdiction over the defendant. It held that the occurrence of the
injury within Illinois fulfilled the statutory requirement that the tortious
act must be committed there and that due process did not preclude the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. Other courts have yet to
extend their jurisdiction so far.59 What if a nonresident defendant did
not contemplate any interstate business and the plaintiff brought its
product into the state? Such problems of jurisdiction will continue to
attend the enforcement of a manufacturer's liability for injuries arising
from defective products.
Now comes the time to ask Quo vademus in strict liability.
The development of strict liability for defective products, for indus-
trial injuries covered by workmen's compensation, and for injuries
caused by ultra-hazardous activities, presages the abandonment of long-
standing concepts of fault in accident cases. The significant innovations
in products liability may well be carried over to such cases.60 On the
highways alone injury and slaughter are not occasional events, but the
order of the day, and sooner or later there is bound to be more rational
distribution of their costs than is now possible under the law of
negligence. It is ironic that in the field of automobile accidents, where
the need for compensating victims regardless of fault is most urgent,
56. See Com men t, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
57. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
58. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11.2d 432 (1961).
59. E.g., Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 A.C.A. 348, 40 Cal.Rptr. 833 (1964).
60. See Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189,
205-206 (1965).
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we continue to let fault determine whether or not there shall be com-
pensation.6 1
Any system of enterprise liability or social insurance designed to
replace existing tort law as the means for compensating injured parties
should provide adequate but not undue compensation. Only if reason-
ably adequate compensation is assured can the law justify closing
traditional avenues of tort recovery. On the other hand, once adequate
compensation for economic loss is assured, consideration might well be
given to establishing curbs on such potentially inflationary damages as
those for pain and suffering.6 2 Otherwise the cost of assured compen-
sation could become prohibitive.
If in time the accident problem is solved through some compensation
scheme that covers the basic economic losses of accident victims, it will
remain to be seen whether the law of negligence as we know it today in
this area will atrophy or will survive in a diminished role to afford
additional compensation to victims whose injuries are caused by actual
fault on the part of others.68 Money damages, of course, can never
really compensate for the noneconomic losses resulting from personal
injuries. Although it is therefore reasonable to exclude such losses
from coverage in any purely compensatory system, inherent justice
between the person injured and the person who caused the injury may
demand compensation for such losses when the latter was actually at
fault. Something of this sort has apparently taken place in England.
The adoption of broad social insurance to cover accident and other
losses has been followed by judicial limitation of strict liability in tort.
Liability for negligence remains, however, and the problem of double
recovery is resolved pragmatically by deducting one-half of the social
insurance benefits that would be received for the first five years after
the accident from the damages for lost earnings.64
As we enter the computer age we are still far from solving the massive
accident problems that began with the industrial revolution. The cases
on products liability are emerging as early chapters of a modern history
on strict liability that will take long in the writing. There is a wealth
of analogy yet to be developed from the exploding bottles of yesteryear,
from lathes on the loose, and capricious safety valves, and drugs with
offside effects. There are meanings for tomorrow to be drawn from
their exceptional behavior.
61. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTs 729-784 (1956).
62. See Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 476 (1959);
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal.2d 498, 509 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
63. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 158 (1959); James, Social Insurance and
Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 537
(1952).
64. Friedmann, supra note 63 at 155 (1959).
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